Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation

Arbeitspapier

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 52.2003

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Thema: Coalition formation ; Farsightedness ; Cautiousness ; Positive spillovers ; Largest consistent set ; Koalition ; Spieltheorie ; Spillover-Effekt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Mauleon, Ana ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118073
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ