Arbeitspapier

Coalition formation in generalized apex games

The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of solutions is introduced and its meaning for the induced hedonic game is analyzed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable partitions are stated and core stable partitions are characterized.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 38.2012

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Subject
Apex Games
Core Stability
Hedonic Games
Strong Monotonicity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Karos, Dominik
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Karos, Dominik
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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