Arbeitspapier
On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence
The labour economics literature on signalling assumes workers know their own abilities. Well-settled experimental evidence contradicts that assumption: in the absence of hard facts, subjects are on average overconfident. First we show that in any equilibrium of any signalling model, overconfidence cannot make players better off. In order to obtain more detailed predictions, we then introduce a specific on-the-job signalling model. We show that at fully-separating equilibrium, overconfident workers choose tasks that are too onerous, fail them, and, dejected by such a failure, settle down for a position inferior to their potential. Such a pattern leads to permanent underemployment of workers, and inefficiency of the economy. For the case of unbiased workers uncertain about their own value, we determine a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of fully-separating equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1274
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Squintani, Francesco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Squintani, Francesco
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1999
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
On-the-job search and sorting
On-the-job search and sorting
On-the-Job Search and Sorting
On-the-Job Search and City Structure
Unemployment Equilibrium and On-the-Job Search
Minimum Wages and On-the-Job Training
Self-confidence out shooting
Self-confidence and search
Self-confidence and search
Differences in On-the-Job Learning across Firms
Technological progress, on-the-job search, and unemployment
On-the-job training, firing costs and employment
On-the-job search and sorting
On-the-job search and sorting
On-the-Job Search and Sorting
On-the-Job Search and City Structure
Unemployment Equilibrium and On-the-Job Search
Minimum Wages and On-the-Job Training
Self-confidence out shooting
Self-confidence and search
Self-confidence and search
Differences in On-the-Job Learning across Firms
Technological progress, on-the-job search, and unemployment
On-the-job training, firing costs and employment
On-the-job search and sorting
On-the-job search and sorting
On-the-Job Search and Sorting
On-the-Job Search and City Structure
Unemployment Equilibrium and On-the-Job Search
Minimum Wages and On-the-Job Training
Self-confidence out shooting
Self-confidence and search
Self-confidence and search
Differences in On-the-Job Learning across Firms
Technological progress, on-the-job search, and unemployment