Correction to: Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource, 1 online resource.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Correction to: Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions ; volume:13 ; number:2 ; day:26 ; month:4 ; year:2023 ; pages:669-704 ; date:6.2023
Dynamic games and applications ; 13, Heft 2 (26.4.2023), 669-704, 6.2023
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s13235-022-00483-7
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023091013004178430408
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:51 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Fu, Jing
- Page, Frank
- Zigrand, Jean-Pierre
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions
Stable coalitions
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable international environmental agreements: Large coalitions that achieve little
On stable and unstable equilibrium.
Stable populations and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium
Contractually stable networks
Is Kyle’s equilibrium model stable?
Contagion in Stable Networks
Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions
Stable coalitions
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable international environmental agreements: Large coalitions that achieve little
On stable and unstable equilibrium.
Stable populations and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium
Contractually stable networks
Is Kyle’s equilibrium model stable?
Contagion in Stable Networks
Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions
Stable coalitions
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable international environmental agreements: Large coalitions that achieve little
On stable and unstable equilibrium.
Stable populations and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium
Contractually stable networks
Is Kyle’s equilibrium model stable?