Arbeitspapier
Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,116
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Externalities
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Thema
-
Overlapping Coalitions
Cover Function
Bargaining
Symmetric Game
Network
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Agbaglah, Messan
Ehlers, Lars
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Agbaglah, Messan
- Ehlers, Lars
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2010
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