Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using a quasi-linear scoring rule. Suppliers have private information about their costs, which is summarized by a multi-dimensional type. The scoring rule reduces the multidimensional bids submitted by each supplier to a single dimension, the score, which is used for deciding on the allocation and the resulting contractual obligation. We exploit this idea and obtain two kinds of results. First, we characterize the set of equilibria in quasi-linear scoring auctions with multi-dimensional types. In particular, we show that there exists a mapping between the class of equilibria in these scoring auctions and those in standard single object IPV auctions. Second, we prove a new expected utility equivalence theorem for quasi-linear scoring auctions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 148.2004

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement ; Auctions
• Subject: Auctions ; Procurement ; Auktion ; Beschaffung ; Erwartungsnutzen

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Asker, John ; Cantillon, Estelle
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118024
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET