Scoring auctions with non-quasilinear scoring rules

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each firm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be computed without any endogeneity problems and we get explicit solutions. (ii) We provide a complete characterisation of such equilibria and compare quality, price and expected scores across first-score and second-score auctions. (iii) We show that such properties and rankings depend on the curvature properties of the scoring rule and the distribution function of types.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 902

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127088
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET