Arbeitspapier
Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules Without the Ordering Assumption
Earlier derivations of scoring rules, by Smith(1973) and Young(1975), assumed that a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives on his or her ballot. This paper shows that scoring rules can be derived without this ordering assumption. It is shown that a voting rule must be a scoring rule if it satisfies three basic axioms: reinforcement, overwhelming majorities, and neutrality. Other range and nonreversal axioms are also discussed.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1063
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Myerson, Roger B.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1993
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Myerson, Roger B.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1993