Arbeitspapier

Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules Without the Ordering Assumption

Earlier derivations of scoring rules, by Smith(1973) and Young(1975), assumed that a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives on his or her ballot. This paper shows that scoring rules can be derived without this ordering assumption. It is shown that a voting rule must be a scoring rule if it satisfies three basic axioms: reinforcement, overwhelming majorities, and neutrality. Other range and nonreversal axioms are also discussed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1063

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Myerson, Roger B.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
1993

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Myerson, Roger B.
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 1993

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