Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules Without the Ordering Assumption

Arbeitspapier

Earlier derivations of scoring rules, by Smith(1973) and Young(1975), assumed that a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives on his or her ballot. This paper shows that scoring rules can be derived without this ordering assumption. It is shown that a voting rule must be a scoring rule if it satisfies three basic axioms: reinforcement, overwhelming majorities, and neutrality. Other range and nonreversal axioms are also discussed.

Show object

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1063

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Myerson, Roger B.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 1993

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221420