Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions
This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using a quasi-linear scoring rule. Suppliers have private information about their costs, which is summarized by a multi-dimensional type. The scoring rule reduces the multidimensional bids submitted by each supplier to a single dimension, the score, which is used for deciding on the allocation and the resulting contractual obligation. We exploit this idea and obtain two kinds of results. First, we characterize the set of equilibria in quasi-linear scoring auctions with multi-dimensional types. In particular, we show that there exists a mapping between the class of equilibria in these scoring auctions and those in standard single object IPV auctions. Second, we prove a new expected utility equivalence theorem for quasi-linear scoring auctions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 148.2004
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Auctions
- Thema
-
Auctions
Procurement
Auktion
Beschaffung
Erwartungsnutzen
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Asker, John
Cantillon, Estelle
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Asker, John
- Cantillon, Estelle
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2004
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