Arbeitspapier
Analyzing vertical mergers with auctions upstream
We develop a model of vertical mergers with open auctions upstream, This setting may be appropriate for industries where inputs are procured via auction-like "requests for proposal." For example, Drennan et al (2020) reports that a model of this type was used during the CVS-Aetna merger investigation, Our approach contrasts with a growing body of work on vertical mergers where input prices are determined through Nash bargaining, We discuss how the vertical merger effects of raising rivals' costs and eliminating double markup might be quantified in our particular model.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 21-4
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Podwol, Joseph U.
Raskovich, Alexander
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
- (wo)
-
Washington, DC
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Podwol, Joseph U.
- Raskovich, Alexander
- U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
Entstanden
- 2021
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