Arbeitspapier
Analyzing vertical mergers with auctions upstream
We develop a model of vertical mergers with open auctions upstream, This setting may be appropriate for industries where inputs are procured via auction-like "requests for proposal." For example, Drennan et al (2020) reports that a model of this type was used during the CVS-Aetna merger investigation, Our approach contrasts with a growing body of work on vertical mergers where input prices are determined through Nash bargaining, We discuss how the vertical merger effects of raising rivals' costs and eliminating double markup might be quantified in our particular model.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 21-4
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Podwol, Joseph U.
Raskovich, Alexander
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
- (where)
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Washington, DC
- (when)
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2021
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Podwol, Joseph U.
- Raskovich, Alexander
- U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
Time of origin
- 2021
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