Vertical Mergers, Foreclosure and Raising Rivals' Costs - Experimental Evidence
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783863040048
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
DICE discussion paper / Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf ; No. 5
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Kartell
Vertikale Integration
Spieltheorie
Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Düsseldorf
- (wer)
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Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wann)
-
2010
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201101031136
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:29 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Normann, Hans-Theo
- Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2010
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