Arbeitspapier
Tax evasion and competition
Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, this paper shows that more intense competition may have the negative side-effect of eroding tax revenues by increasing tax evasion. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave or convex and inelastic. The desirable result of more competition, less evasion and higher tax revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2104
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
Steuerflucht
Wettbewerb
Oligopol
Indirekte Steuer
Steueraufkommen
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goerke, Laszlo
Runkel, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goerke, Laszlo
- Runkel, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2007