Arbeitspapier

Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion

Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a nonsystematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1666

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Subject
corruption
firms
tax evasion
Korruption
Unternehmensbesteuerung
Steuervermeidung
Steuerkriminalität
Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goerke, Laszlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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