Arbeitspapier

Income Tax Buyouts and Income Tax Evasion

A tax buyout is a contract between tax authorities and a tax payer which reduces the marginal income tax rate in exchange for a lump-sum payment. While previous contributions have focussed on labour supply, we consider the interaction with tax evasion and show that a buyout can increase expected tax revenues. This will be the case if (1) the audit probability is constant and the penalty for evasion is a function of undeclared income or (2) the penalty depends on the amount of taxes evaded, and authorities use information about income generated by the decision about a tax buyout offer when setting audit probabilities. Since individuals will only utilise a tax buyout if they are better off, higher tax revenues imply that such contracts can be Pareto-improving.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4613

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Subject
asymmetric information
revenues
self-selection
tax buyouts
tax evasion

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goerke, Laszlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
11.03.2025, 7:35 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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