Arbeitspapier

Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government takes into account these effects when pursuing his own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2212

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
executive compensation
financial accounting
tax evasion
Bilanzpolitik
Steuerkriminalität
Risikoaversion
Vergütungssystem
Führungskräfte
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goerke, Laszlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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