Arbeitspapier
Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences
A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government takes into account these effects when pursuing his own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2212
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Subject
-
executive compensation
financial accounting
tax evasion
Bilanzpolitik
Steuerkriminalität
Risikoaversion
Vergütungssystem
Führungskräfte
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Goerke, Laszlo
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Goerke, Laszlo
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2008
Other Objects (12)
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion
Income Tax Buyouts and Income Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Relative consumption and tax evasion
Relative consumption and tax evasion
Tax Evasion in a Unionised Economy
Human capital formation and tax evasion
Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion
Tax evasion and competition
Tax evasion in a Cournot oligopoly with endogenous entry
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion
Income Tax Buyouts and Income Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Relative consumption and tax evasion
Relative consumption and tax evasion
Tax Evasion in a Unionised Economy
Human capital formation and tax evasion
Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion
Tax evasion and competition
Tax evasion in a Cournot oligopoly with endogenous entry
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion
Income Tax Buyouts and Income Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Relative consumption and tax evasion
Relative consumption and tax evasion
Tax Evasion in a Unionised Economy
Human capital formation and tax evasion
Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion
Tax evasion and competition