Arbeitspapier
Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences
A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government takes into account these effects when pursuing his own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2212
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
executive compensation
financial accounting
tax evasion
Bilanzpolitik
Steuerkriminalität
Risikoaversion
Vergütungssystem
Führungskräfte
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goerke, Laszlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goerke, Laszlo
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2008