The profitable supression of inventions: Technology choice and entry deterrence

Arbeitspapier

AT&T was known for both funding a world-class research lab and delaying deployment of useful innovations from the lab. To explain this behavior we consider a model with an incumbent facing a potential entrant. The incumbent can choose from two technologies for production: old and new. The entrant's choice is limited to the old. We show that, under correlated production uncertainty, use of the common technology exposes the entrant to a greater risk. Therefore, the incumbent may suppress a newer, more efficient technology in favor of the old as a means to deter entry.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 702

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: technology choice ; entry deterrence ; production shocks ; correlations of strategies ; Technologiewahl ; Markteintritt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Creane, Anthony ; Miyagiwa, Kaz
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (wo): Osaka
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92850
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ