Entry Deterrence in Postal Service Markets

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we analyze the incentive of the German postal service (Deutsche Post AG, DPAG) to increase quality in the light of the upcoming liberalization of the postal services market. Currently, there would be no incentive for DPAG to increase its quality if the market were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that the current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality improvement. In particular we show that this rise in quality is only profitable to DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or even impossible. However, consumers benefit from higher quality, whether entry is deterred or accommodated.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 07-083

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Regulation ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
• Thema: regulation ; liberalization ; postal services ; Postbeförderung ; Deregulierung ; Dienstleistungsqualität ; Markteintritt ; Deutschland

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24668
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ