Entry Deterrence in Postal Service Markets

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we analyze the incentive of the German postal service (Deutsche Post AG, DPAG) to increase quality in the light of the upcoming liberalization of the postal services market. Currently, there would be no incentive for DPAG to increase its quality if the market were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that the current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality improvement. In particular we show that this rise in quality is only profitable to DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or even impossible. However, consumers benefit from higher quality, whether entry is deterred or accommodated.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 07-083

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Regulation ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
• Subject: regulation ; liberalization ; postal services ; Postbeförderung ; Deregulierung ; Dienstleistungsqualität ; Markteintritt ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24668
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET