Arbeitspapier

International network competition

We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of NRAs to distort termination rates. We provide conditions under which each of these policies increase efficiency and aggregate welfare. Our findings provide theoretical support for recent policy initiatives by the European Commission.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1005

Classification
Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
Subject
Cross-border ownership
decentralized regulation
international markets
network competition
telecoms
termination rates

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Tangerås, Thomas P.
Tåg, Joacim
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Tangerås, Thomas P.
  • Tåg, Joacim
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Time of origin

  • 2014

Other Objects (12)