Arbeitspapier
International network competition
We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of NRAs to distort termination rates. We provide conditions under which each of these policies increase efficiency and aggregate welfare. Our findings provide theoretical support for recent policy initiatives by the European Commission.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1005
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
- Subject
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Cross-border ownership
decentralized regulation
international markets
network competition
telecoms
termination rates
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Tangerås, Thomas P.
Tåg, Joacim
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (where)
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Stockholm
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Tangerås, Thomas P.
- Tåg, Joacim
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Time of origin
- 2014