Arbeitspapier

Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Competition and Regulation of Connectivity

In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory regimes: a global connectivity regulation (GCR) and an efficient component pricing regulation (ECPRe). Whereas a GCR imposes a full quality of reciprocal interconnection, firms will choose vertical product differentiation in order to lower price competition, while under a ECPRe they will choose the maximum level of services quality and a global degradation of connectivity. Hence firms' decisions about whether or not vertically differentiate products seems to be, at least partially, related to regulatory rules imposed on the market.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 405

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lanzi, Diego
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2001

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4896
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lanzi, Diego
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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