Arbeitspapier
Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Competition and Regulation of Connectivity
In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory regimes: a global connectivity regulation (GCR) and an efficient component pricing regulation (ECPRe). Whereas a GCR imposes a full quality of reciprocal interconnection, firms will choose vertical product differentiation in order to lower price competition, while under a ECPRe they will choose the maximum level of services quality and a global degradation of connectivity. Hence firms' decisions about whether or not vertically differentiate products seems to be, at least partially, related to regulatory rules imposed on the market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 405
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lanzi, Diego
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2001
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4896
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lanzi, Diego
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2001