Arbeitspapier

Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with substantial product differentiation

Since Kreps and Scheinkman's seminal article (1983) a large number of papers have analyzed capacity constraints' potential to relax price competition. However, the ensuing literature has assumed that products are either perfect or very close substitutes. Therefore none of the papers has investigated the interaction between capacity constraints and substantial local monopoly power. The aim of the present paper is to shed light on this question using a standard Hotelling setup. The high level of product dfferentiation results in a variety of equilibrium firm behavior and it generates at least one pure strategy equilibrium for any capacity level. Thus the presence of local monopoly power challenges one of the most general findings about Bertrand-Edgeworth competition: the non-existence of pure strategy equilibria for some capacity levels.

ISBN
978-615-5243-92-9
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2013/32

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Duopoly
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition
Hotelling
Capacity constraint

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Somogyi, Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Somogyi, Robert
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Entstanden

  • 2013

Ähnliche Objekte (12)