Arbeitspapier

Excess capacity and pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets: Experimental evidence

We conduct experiments testing the relationship between excess capacity and pricing in repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies and triopolies. We systematically vary the experimental markets between low excess capacity (suggesting monopoly) and no capacity constraints (suggesting perfect competition). Controlling for the number of firms, higher production capacity leads to lower prices. However, the decline in prices as industry capacity rises is less pronounced than predicted by Nash equilibrium, and a model of myopic price adjustments has greater predictive power. With higher capacities, Edgeworth-cycle behavior becomes less pronounced, causing lower prices. Evidence for tacit collusion is limited and restricted to low-capacity duopolies.

ISBN
978-3-86304-066-6
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 67

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: General
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
tacit collusion
excess capacity
Edgeworth cycles

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fonseca, Miguel A.
Normann, Hans-Theo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fonseca, Miguel A.
  • Normann, Hans-Theo
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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