Arbeitspapier

Price competition on network

We present a model of imperfect price competition where not all firms can sell to all consumers. A network structure models the local interaction of firms and consumers. We find that aggregate surplus is maximized with a fully connected network, which corresponds to perfect competition, and decreases monotonically as the network becomes less connected until firms become local monopolists. When we study which networks are likely to form in equilibrium, we find that stable networks are not fully connected but are connected enough to rule out local monopolists. Our results extend to oligopolistic competition when consumerscan either buy from a single firm or from all firms.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2011-04

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
network markets
price competition
oligopoly competition
Bertrand competition
Preiswettbewerb
Duopol
Netzwerk

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lever Guzmán, Carlos
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Banco de México
(where)
Ciudad de México
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lever Guzmán, Carlos
  • Banco de México

Time of origin

  • 2011

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