Arbeitspapier

Regulation through reference prices

This paper theoretically analyzes the role of reference prices on competition and welfare in a context of a circular city model with free entry and reference prices, in which paying market prices above a reference negatively affects the utility of consumers. Agents interact in a three-stage game: 1. A policymaker chooses a reference price to maximize consumer welfare. 2. Firms make their entry decision. 3. Firms compete in prices and consumers make their consumption decisions. We find that in equilibrium the market price and the optimal reference price chosen by the policymaker always coincide. In addition, it is shown that the use of reference prices reduces market equilibrium prices compared with the case without reference prices, which implies a net welfare gain for consumers. These gains could be higher in less competitive environments and lower in the presence of higher marginal costs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2022-05

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Regulation
Reference Prices
Welfare Gains

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Salgado, Alfredo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Banco de México
(wo)
Ciudad de México
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Salgado, Alfredo
  • Banco de México

Entstanden

  • 2022

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