Arbeitspapier
Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player earns a fraction delta in [0,1] of the worth of that coalition without that player) earns a zero payoff. This property yields the null player property for delta = 1 and the nullifying player property for delta = 0. We show that efficiency, symmetry, linearity and this delta-reducing player property characterizes the corresponding delta-discounted Shapley value. Moreover, we provide a strategic implementation of these solutions where delta is a discount factor that determines the decrease in value to be distributed in the next round after the proposal is rejected and the remaining players (without the proposer) play a new round of bidding.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-065/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Cooperative TU-game
Shapley value
equal division solution
delta-discounted Shapley value
Axiomatization
Implementation
Discounting
Transferable Utility Games
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van den Brink, Rene
Funaki, Yukihiko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van den Brink, Rene
- Funaki, Yukihiko
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values
Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games
Axiomatizations of Two Types of Shapley Values for Games on Union Closed Systems
A Note on the Shapley Value for Characteristic Functions on Bipartitions
The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies
The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures
Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution
On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games
Who Values The Status of The Entrepreneur?
On Weighted Shapley Values
A Monte Carlo Comparison between the Free Cash Flow and Discounted Cash Flow Approaches
Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values
Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games
Axiomatizations of Two Types of Shapley Values for Games on Union Closed Systems
A Note on the Shapley Value for Characteristic Functions on Bipartitions
The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies
The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures
Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution
On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games
Who Values The Status of The Entrepreneur?
On Weighted Shapley Values
A Monte Carlo Comparison between the Free Cash Flow and Discounted Cash Flow Approaches
Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values
Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games
Axiomatizations of Two Types of Shapley Values for Games on Union Closed Systems
A Note on the Shapley Value for Characteristic Functions on Bipartitions
The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies
The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures
Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution
On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games
Who Values The Status of The Entrepreneur?
On Weighted Shapley Values