Information cascades on the labor market

Arbeitspapier

A model of herding behavior on the labor market is discussed where employers only receive signals with limited precision about the workers' types, but can observe previous employers' decisions. In particular, we study a situation where the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities, in the sense that the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the worker's type whereas the worker tries to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the worker's type, but he does follow his own signal if the worker's history is good.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2001,86

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kübler, Dorothea ; Weizsäcker, Georg
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2001

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62676
• URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10050635
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ