Arbeitspapier
A simple way to identify the degree of collusion under proportional reduction
Proportional reduction is a common cartel practice, in which cartel members reduce their output by the same percentage. We develop a simple method to quantify this reduction relative to a benchmark market equilibrium scenario. Our measure is continuous, has a simple interpretation as the "degree of collusion" and nests the earlier models in the existing literature. More importantly, by exploiting firms ex post heterogeneity and optimality conditions, Corts (1999) critique can be addressed by estimating time-varying degree of industry monopolization from a short panel of firm-level observations. We illustrate the method in Monte-Carlo simulations and in application to the data from the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 497
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
- Thema
-
Cartel
Proportional Reduction
Degree of collusion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Shcherbakov, Oleksandr
Wakamori, Naoki
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.24505
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24505-5
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Shcherbakov, Oleksandr
- Wakamori, Naoki
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2015
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