Arbeitspapier
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against higher expected fines. If firms are sufficiently patient, leniency is inffective; it may even increase collusion. Increasing the probability of an investigation at low levels does not increase deterrence. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 18-16
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Antitrust Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
- Thema
-
antitrust
cartels
deterrence
leniency
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Emons, Winand
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bern, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Bern
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Emons, Winand
- University of Bern, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
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