Arbeitspapier
Optimal auctions with financially constrained bidders
We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indivisible good have liquidity constraints, in that they cannot pay more than their `budget' regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We derive constrained-e±cient and revenue maximizing auctions for this setting. In general, the optimal auction requires `pooling' both at the top and in the middle despite the maintained assumption of a monotone hazard rate. Further, the auctioneer will never ¯nd it desirable to subsidize bidders with low budgets.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1471
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
- Thema
-
optimal auction
budget constraints
Auktionstheorie
Budgetrestriktion
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pai, Mallesh
Vohra, Rakesh V.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pai, Mallesh
- Vohra, Rakesh V.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2008
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