Arbeitspapier

Banking regulation and market making

We present a model of market makers subject to recent banking regulations: liquidity and capital constraints in the style of Basel III and a position limit in the style of the Volcker Rule. Regulation causes market makers to reduce their intermediation by refusing principal positions. However, it can improve the bid-ask spread because it induces new market makers to enter. Since market makers intermediate less, asset prices exhibit a liquidity premium. Costs of regulation can be assessed by measuring principal positions and asset prices but not by measuring bid-ask spreads.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2017-7

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Thema
Financial markets
Market structure and pricing
Financial system regulation and policies

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cimon, David A.
Garriott, Corey
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2017-7
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cimon, David A.
  • Garriott, Corey
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2017

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