Optimal interbank regulation

Arbeitspapier

Recent years have seen renewed interest in the regulation of interbank markets. A review of the literature in this area identifies two gaps: first, the literature has tended to make ad hoc assumptions about the interbank contract space, which makes it difficult to generate convincing policy prescriptions; second, the literature has tended to focus on ex-post interventions that kick in only after an interbank disruption has come underway (e.g., open-market operations, lender-of-lastresort interventions, bail-outs), rather than ex-ante prudential policies. In this paper, I take steps toward addressing both these gaps, namely by building a simple model for the interbank market in which banks optimally choose the form of their interbank contracts. I show that the model delivers episodes that qualitatively resemble the interbank disruptions witnessed during the financial crisis. Some important implications for policy then emerge. In particular, I show that optimal policy requires careful coordination between ex-post and ex-ante interventions, with the ex-ante component surprisingly doing most of the heavy lifting. This suggests that previous literature has underemphasized the role that ex-ante interventions have to play in optimal interbank regulation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2017-48

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Financial Crises ; Financial Institutions and Services: General
• Thema: Financial stability ; Financial system regulation and policies

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Carter, Thomas J.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Bank of Canada
• (wo): Ottawa
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.34989/swp-2017-48
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197854
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ