Arbeitspapier
Optimal capital regulation
We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly. As a result, equity requirements are occasionally binding. Constrained-efficient regulation requires banks to build up additional equity buffers and compensates them for the cost of equity with a permanent increase in lending margins. When buffers are depleted, regulation relaxes the market-imposed equity requirements by raising bank future prospects through temporarily elevated lending margins.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2017-6
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
General Aggregative Models: Neoclassical
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- Thema
-
Credit and credit aggregates
Financial institutions
Financial stability
Financial system regulation and policies
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Moyen, Stéphane
Schroth, Josef
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bank of Canada
- (wo)
-
Ottawa
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.34989/swp-2017-6
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Moyen, Stéphane
- Schroth, Josef
- Bank of Canada
Entstanden
- 2017
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