Arbeitspapier
Best instruments for market discipline in banking
The author develops a dynamic model of banking competition to determine which capital instrument is most effective in disciplining banks' risk choice. Comparisons are conducted between equity, subordinated debentures (SD), and uninsured deposits (UD) as funding sources. The model, adapted from Repullo (2004), analyzes the effectiveness of regulatory capital when banks incorporate charter value and competition for depositors into their risk-taking decision. The paper's main finding is that although all three instruments can induce market discipline on banks, equity weakly dominates SD and UD (with SD weakly dominating UD).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2007-9
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
-
Financial institutions
Bank
Wettbewerb
Bankrisiko
Bankenaufsicht
Regulierung
Wirtschaftsmodell
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Caldwell, Greg
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bank of Canada
- (wo)
-
Ottawa
- (wann)
-
2007
- DOI
-
doi:10.34989/swp-2007-9
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Caldwell, Greg
- Bank of Canada
Entstanden
- 2007
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