Arbeitspapier
Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests
We characterize revenue maximizing head starts for all-pay auctions and lottery contests with many heterogeneous players. We show that under optimal head starts all-pay auctions revenue-dominate lottery contests for any degree of heterogeneity among players. Moreover, all-pay auctions with optimal head starts induce higher revenue than any multiplicatively biased all-pay auction or lottery contest. While head starts are more effective than multiplicative biases in all-pay auctions, they are less effective than multiplicative biases in lottery contests.
- ISBN
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978-3-86788-599-7
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 524
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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all-pay auction
lottery contest
head start
revenue dominance
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Franke, Jörg
Leininger, Wolfgang
Wasser, Cédric
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
- (where)
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Essen
- (when)
-
2014
- DOI
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doi:10.4419/86788599
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Franke, Jörg
- Leininger, Wolfgang
- Wasser, Cédric
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Time of origin
- 2014