Arbeitspapier

Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests

We characterize revenue maximizing head starts for all-pay auctions and lottery contests with many heterogeneous players. We show that under optimal head starts all-pay auctions revenue-dominate lottery contests for any degree of heterogeneity among players. Moreover, all-pay auctions with optimal head starts induce higher revenue than any multiplicatively biased all-pay auction or lottery contest. While head starts are more effective than multiplicative biases in all-pay auctions, they are less effective than multiplicative biases in lottery contests.

ISBN
978-3-86788-599-7
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 524

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
all-pay auction
lottery contest
head start
revenue dominance

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Franke, Jörg
Leininger, Wolfgang
Wasser, Cédric
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
(where)
Essen
(when)
2014

DOI
doi:10.4419/86788599
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Franke, Jörg
  • Leininger, Wolfgang
  • Wasser, Cédric
  • Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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