Arbeitspapier

On the Observational Equivalence of Unilateral Delegation Contracts in Duopoly

In a Cournot duopoly, if only one firm hires a manager while the other remains entrepreneurial, the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium emerges, with the managerial firm as the leader. This happens under at least three different delegation schemes. We illustrate the different meachanisms driving this outcome through the analysis of the map of best replies at the market stage.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1033

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Business Objectives of the Firm

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lambertini, Luca
Delbono, Flavio
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4361
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Delbono, Flavio
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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