Arbeitspapier

Efficient Communication in Organizations

Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. An efficient communication protocol grants complete information payoffs to all organization members, thereby overcoming asymmetric information problems at no cost. This paper characterizes efficient protocols assuming that: (i) some agents within the organization have the knowledge required for optimal decision-making; (ii) both the organization and consulted agents incur losses proportional to the exerted influence activities; and (iii) informed agents can discuss their strategies before being consulted. Under these assumptions, "public advocacy" is the unique efficient communication protocol. This result provides a novel rationale for public advocacy.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 039.2022

Classification
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Information
Communication
Organizations
Efficiency
Costly Talk

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Vaccari, Federico
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2022

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Vaccari, Federico
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2022

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