Arbeitspapier

Power dynamics in organizations

We examine an infi nitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to persistent differences in performance, and why established firms fail to exploit new opportunities, even when they are publicly observable.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0139

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Organization of Production
Thema
internal organization
relational contracting
power

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Li, Jin
Matouschek, Niko
Powell, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Li, Jin
  • Matouschek, Niko
  • Powell, Michael
  • Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)