Power dynamics in organizations

Arbeitspapier

We examine an infi nitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to persistent differences in performance, and why established firms fail to exploit new opportunities, even when they are publicly observable.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0139

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Organization of Production
• Subject: internal organization ; relational contracting ; power

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Li, Jin ; Matouschek, Niko ; Powell, Michael
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142013
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET