Backscratching in Hierarchical Organizations

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which an agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates. The two candidates differ in their ability and, once employed, the worker chooses a level of non-contractible effort to exert in two tasks: one benefits the organization (that is both the principal and the agent) while the other one is less profitable, only benefits the agent and provides him with higher earnings. We provide evidence that: i) low ability workers are more likely to exert effort in the task that is exclusively beneficial to the agent; ii) as a consequence, agents distort the hiring process in favor of the low ability workers and iii) sharing a small part of the organization's profits with the workers alleviates their effort distortion.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2015:10

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Thema: Conflict of Interest ; Effort Distortion ; Profit Sharing ; and Reciprocity

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Maggian, Valeria ; Montinari, Natalia ; Nicolò, Antonio
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (wo): Lund
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260148
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ