Arbeitspapier
Finite blockchain games
This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 355
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
- Thema
-
blockchain
proof-of-work
Nash equilibrium
subgame perfection
selfish mining
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ewerhart, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-188648
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ewerhart, Christian
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2020
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Finite approximations of the Sion-Wolfe game
Acquired Cooperation in Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games
Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
Stochastic adaption in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information
A Criterion for Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata
Finite depth of reasoning and equilibrium play in games with incomplete information
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Cybercrime on the Ethereum Blockchain
Finanzwirtschaftliche Anwendungen der Blockchain-Technologie
Corporate capture of blockchain governance
A Monetary Model of Blockchain
Finite approximations of the Sion-Wolfe game
Acquired Cooperation in Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games
Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
Stochastic adaption in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information
A Criterion for Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata
Finite depth of reasoning and equilibrium play in games with incomplete information
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Cybercrime on the Ethereum Blockchain
Finanzwirtschaftliche Anwendungen der Blockchain-Technologie
Corporate capture of blockchain governance
A Monetary Model of Blockchain
Finite approximations of the Sion-Wolfe game
Acquired Cooperation in Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games
Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
Stochastic adaption in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information
A Criterion for Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata
Finite depth of reasoning and equilibrium play in games with incomplete information
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Cybercrime on the Ethereum Blockchain
Finanzwirtschaftliche Anwendungen der Blockchain-Technologie
Corporate capture of blockchain governance