Arbeitspapier
Finite blockchain games
This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 355
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
- Thema
-
blockchain
proof-of-work
Nash equilibrium
subgame perfection
selfish mining
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ewerhart, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-188648
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ewerhart, Christian
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2020
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