Monografie
An Experimental Test of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity in Case of Complete and Incomplete Information
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Identifier
-
1206814551
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- DOI
-
10.18452/3357
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:56 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
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