Arbeitspapier
Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams: theory and evidence
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely selfish. However, when contributions are made transparent at an interim stage, agents exert higher efforts in the first period and adjust their efforts according to the interim information in the second period. This form of peer pressure reduces free-riding and thus, more efficient outcomes are attained. The results are confirmed in a real effort experiment.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3281
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- Subject
-
Team
transparency
peer pressure
free-riding
incentives
inequity aversion
real effort
experiment
Gruppenarbeit
Leistungsanreiz
Soziales Verhalten
Gerechtigkeit
Informationsökonomik
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Test
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Mohnen, Alwine
Pokorny, Kathrin
Sliwka, Dirk
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mohnen, Alwine
- Pokorny, Kathrin
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2008
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Bonuses and performance evaluations
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Inequality, inequity aversion, and the provision of public goods
Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes
On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
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