Complementarities in corporate governance : ownership concentration, capital structure, monitoring and pecuniary incentives
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Dimensions
-
21 cm
- Extent
-
29 S.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
graph. Darst.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Kieler Arbeitspapiere ; No. 968
- Keyword
-
Corporate Governance
LEN-Modell
Opportunitätskosten
Anreizsystem
Kontrolle
Aktionärsstruktur
Kapitalstruktur
Leistungslohn
Theorie
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Kiel
- (who)
-
Inst. of World Economics
- (when)
-
2000
- Creator
- Table of contents
- Rights
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
11.06.2025, 1:52 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Heinrich, Ralph P.
- Inst. of World Economics
Time of origin
- 2000
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