Complementarities in Corporate Governance: Ownership Concentration, Capital Structure, Monitoring and Pecuniary Incentives

Arbeitspapier

The paper shows that, as owners accumulate larger stakes and hence become less risk-tolerant, their incentives to monitor management are attenuated because monitoring shifts some of the firm's risk from management to owners. This counterbalances the positive effect which more concentrated ownership has on monitoring via reduced free rider problems. Moreover, the paper shows how the opportunity cost of concentrated ownership, which is the loss of risk-sharing benefits, creates scope to use leverage as an additional complementary governance instrument. The paper offers new explanations for several empirical regularities found in the literature.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 968

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Corporate Finance and Governance: General ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
• Thema: Corporate governance ; Complementarity ; Agency problem ; Corporate Governance ; Agency Theory ; Opportunitätskosten ; Anreizvertrag ; Kontrolle ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Kapitalstruktur ; Leistungsorientierte Vergütung ; Theorie ; Deutschland ; Japan ; Vereinigte Staaten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Heinrich, Ralph P.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17833
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ