Arbeitspapier
Leadership in a public goods experiment with permanent and temporary members
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 202
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- Thema
-
Cooperation
leadership
social dilemma
public goods provision
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Angelova, Vera
Güth, Werner
Kocher, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
-
München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Angelova, Vera
- Güth, Werner
- Kocher, Martin
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2019
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