Arbeitspapier | Working paper
Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
- Umfang
-
Seite(n): 14
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion
- Erschienen in
-
IHS Working Paper (10)
- Thema
-
Wirtschaft
Management
Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Führung
Interaktion
Kooperation
soziales Dilemma
öffentliches Gut
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Angelova, Vera
Güth, Werner
Kocher, Martin G.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien
- (wo)
-
Österreich, Wien
- (wann)
-
2019
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66132-3
- Rechteinformation
-
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Angelova, Vera
- Güth, Werner
- Kocher, Martin G.
- Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien
Entstanden
- 2019
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members
Leadership in a public goods experiment with permanent and temporary members
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
Boundedly Rational Decision Emergence - A General Perspective and Some Selective Illustrations
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
How ultimatum offers emerge: A study in bounded rationality
Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members
Leadership in a public goods experiment with permanent and temporary members
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
Boundedly Rational Decision Emergence - A General Perspective and Some Selective Illustrations
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
How ultimatum offers emerge: A study in bounded rationality
Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members
Leadership in a public goods experiment with permanent and temporary members
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
Boundedly Rational Decision Emergence - A General Perspective and Some Selective Illustrations
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach