Arbeitspapier

Lobbying and Legislative Organization The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure

zu Verbundenen Objekten

We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that the effectiveness of lobbying lies in changing the viable policy coalitions.We show in a multi-period policy framework that a distinguishing feature between the US Congress and European parliamentary systems – the vote of confidence procedure - can significantly change the incentives for interest group lobbying.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working paper ; No. 1-2002

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Economics: General
General Aggregative Models: General
Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General
Public Economics: General
Thema
Organizational form
legislative institutions
Lobbying
Parliamentary systems
Politics
Interest groups

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bennedsen, Morten
Feldmann, Sven E.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
(wo)
Frederiksberg
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bennedsen, Morten
  • Feldmann, Sven E.
  • Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2002

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