Arbeitspapier
Precise Control over Legislative Vote Outcomes: A Forensic Approach to Political Economics
We propose a forensic approach to investigate the politico-economic forces that influence narrow vote outcomes in legislative assemblies. Applying nonparametric estimation techniques to a data set covering all roll call votes between 1990 and 2014, we can identify the existence of precise control over legislative vote outcomes in the U.S. House of Representatives. Several pieces of evidence indicate that this control seems to be, at least partly, driven by campaign finance donations. Moreover, control seems to be most prevalent in times of higher electoral competition, i.e. during election years. Our contribution sheds new light on the role of money in politics and, more generally, opens a novel perspective to empirical research on legislative voting.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6007
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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forensic economics
campaign finance
special interest groups
lobbying
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Matter, Ulrich
Slotwinski, Michaela
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2016
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Matter, Ulrich
- Slotwinski, Michaela
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2016