Arbeitspapier

Precise Control over Legislative Vote Outcomes: A Forensic Approach to Political Economics

We propose a forensic approach to investigate the politico-economic forces that influence narrow vote outcomes in legislative assemblies. Applying nonparametric estimation techniques to a data set covering all roll call votes between 1990 and 2014, we can identify the existence of precise control over legislative vote outcomes in the U.S. House of Representatives. Several pieces of evidence indicate that this control seems to be, at least partly, driven by campaign finance donations. Moreover, control seems to be most prevalent in times of higher electoral competition, i.e. during election years. Our contribution sheds new light on the role of money in politics and, more generally, opens a novel perspective to empirical research on legislative voting.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6007

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
forensic economics
campaign finance
special interest groups
lobbying

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Matter, Ulrich
Slotwinski, Michaela
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Matter, Ulrich
  • Slotwinski, Michaela
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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