Arbeitspapier
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution
It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected revenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 814
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
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enforcement of the law
settlement
tax evasion
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Macho-Stadler, Ines
Pérez-Castrillo, David
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Macho-Stadler, Ines
- Pérez-Castrillo, David
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2002
Other Objects (12)
Fair tax evasion
Timing Tax Evasion
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Welfare Improving Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Productivity and Tax Evasion
Tax evasion and trust
Tax Evasion and Inequality
Tax evasion and competition
Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences
Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion
Fair tax evasion
Timing Tax Evasion
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Welfare Improving Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Productivity and Tax Evasion
Tax evasion and trust
Tax Evasion and Inequality
Tax evasion and competition
Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences
Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion
Fair tax evasion
Timing Tax Evasion
Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion
Welfare Improving Tax Evasion
Tax evasion by firms
Tax evasion by individuals
Productivity and Tax Evasion
Tax evasion and trust
Tax Evasion and Inequality
Tax evasion and competition
Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences